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In recent National Basketball Association history there has been no team more 
dominant the Golden State Warriors. They won three championships in five years, 
during an incredible stretch from 2014 to 2019. Their style of play, free-flowing and 
three-point heavy, would change the league, but during that same time the look of the 
Warriors fandom was also changing. For those years, as was the case for the past few 
decades, the Warriors played at Oracle Arena in Oakland, California. In 2019 they 
moved across the San Francisco Bay to Chase Center, 11 miles from their previous 
home. It is this move that I argue is a broader shift in the Warriors team and fan 
identity. Can a fandom be gentrified? What is the relationship between gentrification in 
Oakland and the changing identity of the Golden State Warriors and their fans? How is 
place’s identity tied to a team’s identity and the identity of its fans? What role does 
communications play in this changing identity? These are the questions I look to answer 
as I explore what it means to be a fan, the history of Oakland, gentrification, and the rise 
and fall of the Warriors. Through a historical and textual analysis, I find that the 
feelings of “belonging and disbelonging,” as coined by Werth and Marienthal (2016), 
produced by gentrification can similarly be found in narratives around the Warriors and 
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For a period of time starting in 2014, there was no escaping the Golden State 
Warriors. The sports world was saturated with Warriors content, whether it was talk 
over their 3-point happy playing style or their analytics-driven organizational 
philosophy. And how could they not talk? The Warriors went from being the one of the 
worst teams in the league, a franchise with a 39-year championship drought, to one of 
the most dominant teams the NBA has ever seen, one which would go on to win three 
championships in a mere four-year span. They broke the regular season win-loss record, 
previously held by Michael Jordan’s Chicago Bulls, when they finished with 73-9 in the 
2015-2016 season. They formed a super team to end all super teams when they added 
all-star Kevin Durant to an already stacked roster that included Stephen Curry, Klay 
Thompson and Draymond Green. The Warriors, for five years, seemed unstoppable.  
Perhaps that explains why the hate and the jokes seemed particularly vicious 
when they lost to the Cleveland Cavaliers in the 2016 championship series. By an 
incredible twist of fate, the Warriors managed to choke a 3-1 lead and failed to cap off 
their historical run. A team that won 73 out of 82 games couldn’t come up with four out 
of seven. Non-Warriors fans could not help but jump at the chance to deride the team 
that was the bane of the rest of the NBA. Throughout the memes that ran in that summer 
of 16’, a particular character emerged: the clueless tech-bro Warriors fan. He was a 
bandwagoner who jumped on because it was convenient to root for the best team in the 
NBA. He did not really know anything about basketball, a casual fan at best. Perhaps he 
relied heavily on the language of analytics and statistics to justify his takes on why 





Figure 1. An image widely circulated on Twitter of a sign made by Warriors fans in the 2016 
playoffs. Widely mocked for the use of superfluous quotation marks and dorky copy. (Stephan Bondy. 
2016). 
But how did this trope of the clueless white tech-bro come to be symbolic for an 
entire fanbase, and to a certain extent, an entire region? How did a team that played in 
Oakland, California, a historically black and brown city and a hotspot of black activism, 
turn into the de facto team of Silicon Valley? 
 On September 6, 2019, Chase Stadium officially opened, marking a new 
chapter of the NBA’s Golden State Warriors. The opening marked a return to San 
Francisco after fifty years in Oakland, a move that carried them only 11 miles from 




the hearts of Oakland fans. As Chris Rhoden (2019) noted in an article written for 
ESPN platform The Undefeated: 
For longtime Oakland residents, including [Oakland Mayor Libby 
Schaaf], the Warriors’ move from East Oakland to downtown San 
Francisco seems yet another slap in the face to a city that has always 
seemed to live in the shadow of the City by the Bay. (para. 11) 
So, what might appear to be an inconsequential change in locales to outsiders feels 
more akin to an insult or even a betrayal of Oakland and its residents for those who call 
The Town home. Damian Lillard, Portland Trail Blazers star and Oakland native, 
articulated as much in an interview where he commented that: 
There's a sense of pride in Oakland about everything that represents us 
and it's like the Warriors go over the bridge…it's almost like the money 
grab, the money moves is pushing the real love and what's really behind 
this organization to the side, which is understandable and also not 
understandable because I'm from Oakland. (NBC Sports Bay Area, 2019, 
para. 11)  
I argue that this perceived shift away from Oakland is symbolic of the greater shift in 
Warriors fan and team identity. And that this shift exists in a broader narrative of 
gentrification in Oakland, a process where longtime residents, many of whom are black 
and brown, are displaced by the more affluent, white newcomers, partially driven by the 
same tech-boom that benefited the Warrior’s venture capitalist owner, Joseph Lacob. 
Fandom and gentrification are both ultimately questions of identity, who belongs and 
who doesn’t. My thesis aims to connect the two and reveal what we can learn about 




Research Questions and Project Description 
What is the relationship between gentrification in Oakland and the changing 
identity of the Golden State Warriors and their fans? How is a place’s identity tied to a 
team’s identity and the identity of its fans? What role does communications play in this 
changing identity? These are the questions my thesis will try to answer while using the 
Golden State Warriors and gentrification in Oakland as a case study. While it might 
seem odd to compare the two, as Bale (2002) notes, “…regions form a central feature of 
the organisation of sports; places are the means of identifying most sports teams; sport 
is affected by, and increasingly affects, the physical environment and landscape; sport is 
a world of territoriality and hierarchies” (p. 2). Far from being a marginal part of 
society, sports are a major factor in political, economic, and social life. They can act as 
mirrors that reflect broader narratives in society. For instance, one might look at the 
infamous 2004 “Malice at the Palace” fight between players and fans as a representation 
of race relations in America. In the same way, my thesis will use the Golden State 
Warriors as a lens to analyze the forces of gentrification in Oakland and gentrification 
as a lens understand the Golden State Warriors. I want my research to assert sports’ 
relevance in conversations around social, cultural, economic and political issues. I 





My research aims to explore the relationship between place and team, by using 
the NBA’s Golden State Warriors and gentrification in Oakland as my case study. I will 
approach this using historical analysis. A historical analysis attempts to construct the 
past as it actually was, to understand the relationship between events over time (Tosh, 
2010). In my thesis, I will be using it to understand and contextualize the changing look 
of Oakland and the Warriors, looking at gentrification in Oakland and the Warriors 
team and fan identity from 2012 to 2019. I chose this period because Chase Stadium, 
the team’s new arena in San Francisco, was first announced in 2012 and the move made 
final in 2019, a move I argue is symbolic of a larger shift in identity for both the team 
and the fandom. I believe a historical analysis is the most appropriate method for this 
study because writing about sports and fandom tends to fall into the realm of social 
memory, where the version of events and experiences presented is the group’s shared 
interpretation of those events and experiences (Tosh, 2010, pp. 3-4). Even our 
recollection of the recent past is undoubtedly tinged by our knowledge in the present. 
To go from pure interpretation to a more complete view of what happened with the 
Warriors, then, requires a historical approach. Most importantly, this method situates 
concerns of basketball and sports fandom within the broader conflicts and history of the 
region. By comparing how gentrification is changing Oakland to the changing racial, 
cultural, and economic makeup of the Golden State Warrior's fanbase I hope to better 
understand how a place’s identity affects team identity and fan identity.  
For the gentrification piece of my research, I will use previous works that look 




issue to guide my own analysis. This is not a research project solely on gentrification: 
rather gentrification is a factor that I wish to put in conversation with the Warriors’ 
team and fan identity. As such, I am not looking to develop a completely new insight 
about gentrification in Oakland, but instead to develop a framework of how 
gentrification in Oakland works and define its effects by aggregating previous research 
about the subject. As such, I focus on secondary sources. Specifically, I will use 
McElroy and Werth (2019) and Werth and Marienthal (2016) to build my section on 
gentrification. Overall, my main goal is to come up with a working understanding of 
Oakland’s gentrification that I can then use in my analysis of the Warrior’s team and 
fanbase.  
To look at the conception of the Warriors as a team and as a fanbase, I will be 
engaging in a textual analysis of the various media where the team and its fans are 
represented. This includes sources such as the official media accounts of the Golden 
State Warriors, unofficial media fan accounts, promotional materials, journalism 
coverage, etc. I will look to establish mix of sources that captures differences in 
perspective (national vs. local, fan vs. journalist, team vs. non-team, etc.) over the 
period of 2012-2019. In particular, I think it is important to distinguish mass media 
narratives from the attitudes of individual fans. Mass media tends to flatten or simplify 
issues for the sake of making a story more easily digestible (and more commercially 
viable). While it would be impossible to fully capture all the details of an issue, there is 
no doubt that the mass media privilege certain perspectives at the expense of others. 
Social media remedies this somewhat, opening the floor to anyone with an internet 




scope of any given post is easily gauged, given the in-application measurements such as 
“likes,” “retweets,” “replies”, etc. Other types of sources, such as stand-alone news 
articles, lack this immediate assessment of reception. However, I am not attempting to 
quantify sources as more or less valid. All the texts considered have their own value. As 
Fürsich (2009) states: 
…thorough textual analysis has the goal to explain which cultural 
sensibilities prevail that allow for such a text at this specific point in 
time. These cultural sensibilities can involve everything from seemingly 
calm states of agreed-upon dominant ideologies to active clashes 
between emerging new structures of feeling. (p. 247) 
Each text offers a crucial window on what was happening in the world at the time of its 
creation, no matter where it originated. By including sources from both mass media and 
social media, I hope to produce a more nuanced and more complete view of the 
Warriors and their fans from 2012 to 2019.  
Textual analysis is a broad, often loosely defined, methodology. It is generally 
understood as “a type of qualitative analysis that, beyond the manifest content of media, 
focuses on the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions of the text” (p. 240). 
There are several schools of thought when it comes to textual analysis, drawing from a 
diverse range of interpretive traditions such as linguistics, literary-critical, rhetorical, 
and semiotics. My concern is not so much trying to fit my research to a specific 
strategy, but rather finding a strategy that allows me to best achieve the goals of my 
research. That said, my main focus when analyzing a text are the narratives being 
constructed around the Warriors and/or their fans. What is it trying to communicate to 




the text itself? By answering these questions, I hope to tease out the most relevant 




What does it mean to be a fan? 
To understand what it means to gentrify a team’s fandom, we need to understand 
what fandom is first. Merriam-Webster simply defines it as “all the fans” and a fan as 
“an enthusiastic devotee (as of a sport or a performing art) usually as a spectator.” 
While these dictionary definitions are technically correct, they fail to truly capture the 
depth of fandom.  Fandom, at its core, is about identity. Far from simply choosing to 
support a sports team, to be a fan is to stake your conception of self around a team. It is 
the difference between “my team” and not “the team I like,” never just “they won the 
game” but rather “we won the game.” This bond between fan and team is positive: fans 
identify with a team because it gives them a boost to self-esteem and mood, a sense of 
belonging, an explanation for their behavior (Heere et al. 2007; Foster & Hyatt, 2007).  
Much as how an individual might recognize themselves as part of a community by race, 
class, or gender, fandom is yet another marker for understanding where one belongs in 
the world (Heere et al. 2007). Unlike race, class or gender, fandom is an identification 
an individual has complete choice over, at least theoretically. One is not literally born a 
fan, although some die-hards might disagree. However, the place you were born does 
play a significant role in determining one’s fandom of what team.  
To that end, while there has been no research that I have seen done on the 
relationship of gentrification and sports, there has been a considerable amount of 
research exploring the relationship between place and team. Specifically, a conceptual 
study done by Heere and James (2007) expands on the idea of team identity, which is 
based on an individual’s sense of belonging to a supporter group or connection with a 
sports team. They argue that team identity is a form of group identity and is symbolic of 





other group identities such as ethnicity or geography, what they dub “external group 
identities”. They also suggest that fans see themselves as members of the team 
organization, not just consumers: the fans are invested the team’s success. When teams 
better align with the group identities they represent, they can increase fan loyalty. In 
other words, fan loyalty is strengthened the more a fan feels the sense of belonging to a 
team and the identities it symbolizes (such as a geographic location). Further research 
done by Heere et al. (2011) validates the preposition that external group identities 
influence team identity. Through a survey of college students, they looked at how 
university, city and state identities affected the team identity of the focal college 
football team. Heere et al. (2011) found that “team identity could be explained by the 
student’s identification with the university and indirectly (mediated by university 
identity) by city and state identities”. Empirically, they were able to prove that sports 
teams act as a source of multiple group identities for their fans1. Most importantly, 
Heere et al. (2011) suggest that any change to the associated group identities can have a 
direct or indirect effect on the identity fans have with a sports team. A force like 
gentrification that changes the character of a city, then, might also change the character 
of a team’s or a fandom’s identity. 
Heere et al. use the term group identity to refer to social identity, a 
psychological theory commonly used in fandom studies. It is “a person’s knowledge 
that [they] belong to a social group or category” and “the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership (Stets & Burk, 2000 p. 225; Heere et al. 2007 
                                                      
1 Heere et al. (2011) conducted a questionnaire of two different sample groups (n= 476, n= 197) and then 





p. 324). As mentioned before, social groups/categories can be consciously joined, such 
as becoming a fan of a sports team, or can be designated by uncontrollable factors like 
genetics and place of birth (Stets & Burk, 2000). These social categories are a part of a 
structured society and can only exist in contrast with other categories. For instance, 
being a Warriors fan is only made significant with the existence of the other 29 teams in 
the NBA. Regardless of how a person came to identify with a social group, that 
knowledge of belonging to a group forms an individual’s sense of self. There are two 
important processes in group identity formation: self-categorization and social 
comparison. Self-categorization is where individuals compare themselves to the other 
members of society and categorize the self accordingly. Social comparison is where 
individuals measure themselves against other members of their perceived group. People 
similar to the self are categorized as part of the “in-group” and those different from the 
self as part of the “out-group”. Individuals gain self-esteem when they judge the in-
group positively and when they closely identify with the in-group (Stets & Burk, 2000, 
pp. 225-226). We seek to belong, and for many that sense of belonging is found in 
sports fandom.    
To put it another way, fandom is a way to feel at home. I mean that quite 
literally. Home, as we usually think of it, is the place we were born, the place grew up, 
the place we live in. But home is not just a physical space. As Kraszewski (2008) argues 
in his ethnographic study of a Pittsburgh Steelers fan club in Fort Worth, Texas, home 
can be a sports team. In this environment of late capitalism, traditional and stable ways 
of belonging to communities are weakened. Traditional sites like churches, family and 
voluntary organizations are replaced with more informal bonds (Putnam, 2000). People 




are no longer bound by geography like they once were, as the processes of globalization 
drive displacement and migration. Faced with uncertainty, people tend to turn to what 
communities remain for solace. Sports fandom offers something solid, the types of 
social ties and local identities that are increasingly precious as they become rarer. It 
“resonates with the idea of permanence and geographic origins” for fans because 
“sports carry a regional language of identity” (Kranszewski, 2008 p. 155; p.141). In 
other words, sports fandom is a way for fans to reconnect with home. Most importantly, 
Kranszewski found that the reconnection was not to home as it really exists, which is a 
place full of unresolvable (and uncomfortable) social tensions, but rather home in a 
nostalgic, highly personalized sense. This is kind of simplification is compounded with 
the fact that sports media functions as place-images, which is a concept borrowed from 
sociologist Shields (1991). Place-images serve to flatten and simplify a region’s identity 
into something clear and coherent, instead of a place where identity is something 
contested by multiple groups.  
Baker (2018) also looks at the relationship between diaspora, home, and sports 
fandom, specifically football (soccer, for Americans) fans who live in New Zealand but 
support a team from a different location. Like Kraszeweski (2008), Baker argues that 
sports fandom offers a way to construct a sense of home. Unlike Kraszeweski, Baker is 
more concerned with the emotional connections and home as something that stretches 
across multiple places and spaces, rather than a fixed geographic origin. For her, it is 
those embodied feelings that weave communities together across a distance and elevate 
these home stadiums into “spiritual homes.” Some of the fans she interviews have no 
ties to the places their teams play: they were not born there, did not grow up in the 
Commented [LJ4]: bring this into the textual analysis: sports 
no longer was a nostalgic, personalized home but a reminder of 
the social tensions 
Commented [LJ5]: Gentrification is the ultimate contest of 




geographic location, family not from the location. But despite that, the sensation of 
travelling to these home stadiums is one of a return journey, back to their true homes. 
The emotional bonds between fan and team have a transformative power, one that can 
extend the feeling of belonging across thousands of miles. Even spaces not associated 
with the teams, such as other football stadiums and watch party locations, can act as 
“homes” which shows the flexibility of emotional connections. Through their football 
fandom, these fans in Baker’s study found a diversity of places where they feel they 
belong.  
So, home is associated with a specific region yet can be stretched to multiple 
places. Sports teams carry the flavor of regional identity, but also can take on a global 
tenor. The gaps between these representations and their paradoxical nature speaks to the 
mutability of sports fandom and its powerful ability to forge connections. A fan, by 
engaging in certain rituals and practices that make up “rooting” for a team, can remind 
themselves of “home” in terms of specific local identities but also can create a sense of 
“home” divorced from the regionality of a space. Kraszweski’s Pittsburg transplants 
brought western Pennsylvania to a Fort Worth sports bar, whereas Baker’s Kiwi 
football fans felt they were brought to their spiritual home when their feelings about 
football resonated with a space. Belonging is ultimately tied to identity and identity is 
something constructed, negotiated, ever shifting. Sports fandom can foster a sense of 
belonging, but to what exactly? Or to that matter, to where? Because the meaning of 
sports teams is so highly personalized, it can be hard to find an exact answer.  
There are several different perspectives from the authors surveyed so far. As 




identities: to take an example of this from Kraszewski (2008), the Steelers were 
characterized as blue collar and Eastern European. This representation of the team is 
largely uncontested, even though the representation of the Western Pennsylvania region 
is highly contested. To belong to the Steelers fandom, then, is to belong to a very 
narrow and flattened idea of Western Pennsylvania and find solace in a proletarian sort 
of identity. Crucially, even though most of the fans observed by Kraszewski (2008) 
were NOT part of those group identities (blue collar, specific European ethnicities) they 
still identified with those aspects of the Steelers. Heere et al. (2007) posited that: 
External group identities will strengthen a team identity if fans perceive 
an opportunity to enhance a particular external group identity through the 
team. In other words, team identity must be perceived as a mechanism 
for enhancing a salient external group identity. (p. 331) 
Following that reasoning, the Steelers function as a medium to enhance a fan’s blue 
collar or European identities. Except that does not seem to be the case here. The Steeler 
fans place great significance on being Steeler fans because the Steelers are seen as 
representative of the home that they left. They do not identify with the team because 
those Steeler fans personally believe they are blue collar or Polish and want to heighten 
those aspects of their identity (though that might be true for some fans). Rather than 
viewing team identity as symbolic of external group identities, it might be more logical 
to view those external group identities as internal to team identity. In this case, the 
mythologies of a region have become so intrenched and made so synonymous with a 
team that it would be pointless to try to separate them out. To answer the question from 
earlier, sports fandom, in Kraszeweski’s (2008) study, fosters a sense of belonging to 
home, a home which is a nostalgic memory of region.  




The subsumption of external group identities to team identity also seems to be at 
play in Baker (2018). Or to word it another way, team identity seemed to transcend 
external group identities. The football fans surveyed from New Zealand identified with 
their team and not necessarily with associations represented by their team, such as 
region. For most of them, they were not trying to reconnect with a faraway home 
through their fandom, rather a new connection to home was created by their fandom. 
Amidst the cheering crowds of their team’s stadium, they felt that they truly belonged 
because of their emotional bond to fandom. It was “love of the game” that gave a 
common language or space for disparate individuals who had no other ties to each 
other. If the fans in Kraszweski (2008) looked to return to a home they knew intimately 
well by rooting for the Steelers, the fans in Baker (2018) returned to a home they never 
knew by rooting for their football teams. Sports fandom, here, means to belong to a 
team and find belonging wherever that connection feels strong. 
 The difference in the two examples is not really in the overall effect (creating a 
sense of belonging in disparate spaces) but rather in the individual meaning of fandom. 
This points to the argument made by Sandvoss (2003) that teams are polysemic. His 
hypothesis is that fandom is an extension of the self, which means a team can take on 
different meanings depending on the individual fan. Sandvoss’s example of this is two 
Chelsea fans, one, more affluent, who sees the club as emblematic of success and the 
other, less so, who sees Chelsea as a club that comes close to success but always 
manages to do something wrong in the end. In his interviews, we see something similar 
to what Heere et al. (2007) suggest, where the fan’s external group identities are 




Only, it is not really about what the team actually represents but what the fan wishes 
them to represent. The team is seen less as a mechanism to enhance certain aspects of 
an individual’s identity, which is what Heere et al. suggest, but more like a space of 
“reflection and projection” for the fan’s identity. Denotation or “actual semiotic 
condition” of a team is less important than personal connotation.  
But it would be remiss to assume that the meaning of a team is entirely arbitrary 
or individualized. While in many ways a team’s identity functions as polysemic, I 
believe that there are some facets of it that are so widely believed (and widely 
disseminated) that they become held as definitive truths. The transplanted fans in 
Kraszeweski (2008) unquestioningly accepted the Steelers as a “common and 
simplified” symbol of Western Pennsylvania. As discussed earlier, the external group 
identities of the region, as blue collar and European, have been bound so tightly to the 
Pittsburg Steelers that they are undistinguishable from the team’s identity. Unlike the 
Sandvoss (2003) examples, there was a consensus on what the team meant across fans. 
However, as his hypothesis suggests, fandom acted as an extension of the self for these 
Steeler fans: a proud expression of their Western Pennsylvania roots.  
All this relies on the idea that a sports team is an uncontested and stable 
representation of a region, which is promoted heavily by the sports media. What if that 
representation starts to become unsettled? What if the place-image broadcast by the 
media starts to change? We might find those answers by studying the recent history of 
the Golden State Warriors.  The processes of migration that uprooted those diasporic 




other way as well. New transplants can force old residents out, disrupting the existing 




The Historical Roots of Gentrification in Oakland 
What is gentrification, really? The popular understanding of it seems mostly 
concerned with the aesthetics. The new apartment buildings are blocky, modernist, and 
boring, sticking out like sore thumbs among the old housing stock that they replaced. 
The modernist flavor extends to address signage, where the font of choice is a sans-
serif, vaguely pointing to sleekness and contemporary comfort. The people gentrifying 
are overwhelmingly stereotyped as white, yuppie types clumsily embracing their new 
identity as city dwellers.  
 
Figure 2. A popular tweet showing an example of “gentrification font”. Other Twitter 
users replied with their own versions or locales where this font might be found. 
(@jude_raw, 2020).  
These are some of the most visible markers of gentrification in the cultural 




affluent class relocating or moving into an urban community, which ends up displacing 
the low-income residents (Rérat et al, 2009, p. 336). This demographic shift also 
involves a physical rehabilitation of the area, both residential, public, and commercial 
(which gets to the aesthetics mentioned before). In practice this has looked like rising 
rents, forced evictions, new housing complexes and businesses. Popular understanding 
of gentrification might be narrow, but it points to a real insight: it gets at the idea that 
gentrification appears to follow a familiar pattern no matter the locale. In cities across 
America, a similar narrative seems to be playing out. The areas affected are low-income 
and working class. The actors tend to be young, unmarried, and childless professionals, 
the New Middle Class as referred to by Ley (1996).  There are commonalities, at least 
on the surface. But to generalize too far would be a mistake. While gentrification is a 
global phenomenon, it is also inherently and intimately tied to its spatial context. The 
way gentrification works and feels depends on the place it is happening in. If we wish to 
understand how gentrification can affect fandom, we need to understand the specific 
look of that region’s gentrification. We need to go to Oakland. 
Oakland, Hills and Flatlands 
If San Francisco is the jewel of the Bay, Oakland is more like a semi-precious 
stone: of equal beauty in many ways yet treated as a lesser counterpart. Oakland has 
been San Francisco’s “little brother” from the start: where S.F. grew quickly into the 
Bay’s economic and metropolitan center thanks to a flood of prospectors during the 
Gold Rush and its environmental advantage of a deep-water port (the population 
ballooned from 800 in 1848 to around 25,000 in 1850), Oakland was more like a small 




38). In fact, Oakland’s first main industry was supplying timber for the construction of 
houses and hotels in San Francisco that were desperately needed because of the influx 
of settlers. Even as Oakland has become a commercial center in its own right and a 
major player in fields such as health, transportation and logistics, it has continued to 
suffer a certain image problem. As Rhomberg (2004) comments: 
The usual stereotype casts the East Bay hub as a gray, industrial Second 
City to San Francisco, hardworking but dull in comparison to its more 
glamorous, sophisticated (and European) neighbor on the western side of 
the bay. Other versions paint an even gloomier picture of the 
quintessential American urban wasteland, a desultory sprawl of 
congestion and decay, faceless and culturally vacant. A city with no 
there there, a nonplace where nothing ever really happens. (p. ix) 
While this perception is largely unfair and inaccurate, it is true that the Town2 is 
comparatively less well off than the City. In 2009, 9.6 percent of San Francisco-
Oakland Metropolitan area residents were living in poverty: that number jumps to 17.5 
percent when looking at Oakland alone. The median annual household income for 
Oakland was $49,695, whereas in San Francisco that number was $74,876. But these 
are broad averages that are being compared: within the city limits of Oakland alone 
there are large disparities of income, education and employment. The hills of Oakland, 
which lie towards the city’s outskirts, overwhelmingly tend to be more well-off than the 
flatland areas, which sit next to the bay (Promes, 2011, pp. 32-39).  But how did this 
geography of inequality come to exist? To answer that requires us to delve deeper into 
the history of Oakland. 
                                                      
2 The Town is a nickname affectionally given to Oakland by its residents that distinguishes it from San 





Oakland is a city strongly shaped by the currents of industry. Perhaps the first 
major turning point after its founding in 1852 was the arrival of the railroads. Back in 
1868 the Oakland Waterfront Company had sold, for a mere five dollars, five hundred 
acres of bay frontage and two strips of land for rights of way to Western Pacific 
Railroad, an affiliate of Central Pacific Railroad (whose president, Leland Stanford sat 
on the board of the Waterfront company). Oakland, which sits on the mainland side of 
the bay, was a favorable location for the west coast terminal of the railroad company’s 
new transcontinental line (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 26). Those trains began Oakland’s 
transformation into a genuine economic hub of the East Bay. New businesses sprung up 
around the rails to accommodate the new flocks of passengers and crates of freight that 
moved through the city. By 1911, Oakland was the western terminus for two more 
transcontinental rail lines, where as many as 1600 trains a day passed through the city. 
Automobile assembly plants, too, began popping up in the city in the 1920s with 
General Motors, Chevrolet, Willys, Fageol and Caterpillar Tractor all establishing 
factories in the East Bay: Oakland became known as the “Detroit of the West” 
(Bagwell, 1982, p. 196). Shipbuilding grew into a major industry for the city during 
World War I, but it was the city’s role as a transportation hub that mainly supported its 
economy. Processing industries flourished as they helped to turn the large amounts of 
raw goods that flowed in from the rails into refined products that could be shipped 
across the world.  
The transcontinental rails and the subsequent industries that grew around it 




Oakland to meet the need. Black people, mostly employed as Pullman car porters, 
settled around the rails in West Oakland. Chinese people, who had come in hopes of 
gold and built the railroads that led to Oakland’s prosperity, settled in downtown. Their 
movement was restricted by discriminatory city ordinances and they could only live in 
designated districts (Bagwell, 1982, pp. 87-88). Among white settlers, the first wave 
was mostly Irish and German immigrants and later, Italian and Portuguese immigrants 
(Promes, 2011, p. 56). Another trigger of population growth was the 1906 earthquake 
and fire that devastated San Francisco, sending refugees to Oakland, where an estimated 
65,000 stayed permanently (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 28).   
These large gains of population required new infrastructure to support them. 
Miles of gas mains and electric wires were installed by the Oakland Gas, Light, and 
Heat Company. Land speculators were snapping up plots for residential development 
and bidding on streetcar rights-of-way. In fact, the two often grew in tandem as the land 
around streetcar lines was valuable real estate because of easy access to transportation 
routes. Francis Marion “Borax” Smith attempted to take advantage of this, and 
established Realty Syndicate along with a business partner.  The company tried to buy 
as much land as they could, putting in transportation lines and utilities in an effort to 
gain a monopoly over the region. Realty Syndicate ultimately went under, but before 
that they managed to establish a central transit system by buying electric streetcars, 
electric trains, and ferryboats. This would be known as the Key System, in reference to 
the company’s pier which resembled the teeth of an old-fashioned housekey (Bagwell, 




The City of Oakland, in a bid to attract more industry to the city, positioned the 
area as an idyllic pastoral haven with a comfortable “Mediterranean” climate and ideal 
location close to the San Francisco Bay. Through pamphlets, Oakland’s Chamber of 
Commerce praised the city’s number of schools, paved roads, churches and other 
benefits. The Chamber of Commerce also made the argument that since the workforce 
was mainly made of homeowners, employees were less likely to engage in labor 
movements or political agitation (Promes, 2011, p. 58). But this urban characterization 
of Oakland was not spread equally throughout the city. West Oakland, a largely 
working-class neighborhood, saw little of the beautiful gardens and lawns extolled by 
the pamphlets. Indeed, that area was left to deteriorate, while most of the investment for 
public works, such as parks, was directed to new development in the foothills. The 
developers of these new neighborhoods also made great pains to retain a certain 
character through restrictions: white and well-off (Bagwell, 1982, pp. 201-206). Here, 
we can see the beginnings of the divide between the hills and flatlands in the fledgling 
city, a divide that would only grow larger in the coming years.  
Though the city attracted industrialists with the promise of a docile workforce, it 
did not exactly deliver on it. The advent of industrialization brought workers, but with 
them, the labor and Socialism movements. The burgeoning unions showed their 
strength as early as 1894, when Oakland workers participated in the national Pullman 
strike in 1894 that was organized by Eugene Debs and the American Railway Union. 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions proliferated, thanks to favorable 
conditions such as small firm sizes and a relatively insulated economy. The unions even 




unions across America at this time, their power was undermined by racism and sexism. 
Instead of building a wide labor coalition, union members were mainly native-born 
white men who worked in skilled jobs. That handicap probably prevented them from 
making many inroads into political institutions, although Socialist candidates, on the 
strength of union support and sympathetic European immigrants, managed to almost 
take control of the City Council in the 1911 elections. In response, the local elites 
passed several city charter reforms to weaken the voting power of working-class and 
ethnic members. They also installed a nonpartisan commission to run its government, 
which was ultimately a short-lived experiment. Power struggles continued within the 
ruling class of Oakland, and Joseph P. Knowland, publisher of the Oakland Tribune, 
pushed through a council-manager form of governance with help from a coalition of 
business elites in 1931 (Douzet, 2012, p. 27). This firmly gave control over Oakland to 
Knowland, who would consistently rule in favor for business interests and industrial 
expansion. The Town was a working-class city, but it was the bosses and owners who 
ran it, just as they ran the factories and railroads.  
War-Boom 
Commercial players bent politics to their benefit, but it was war, and federal 
dollars that came with it, that really fueled Oakland’s growth. With the outbreak of 
World War I, Oakland saw huge increases in shipbuilding, heavy industry and logistics. 
One only had to look to the Moore Shipbuilding Company as an example of this 
transformation. In 1906 it employed only 250, which jumped to 13,000 in 1920 
(Bagwell, 1982, p. 190). Its plant expanded from 15 acres to 40 acres in order to fulfill 




Oakland’s development. In just twenty years, the manufacturing working class that had 
accounted for 31 percent of the Oakland labor force increased to accounting for nearly 
40 percent of the labor force (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 46). In the five years between 1914 
and 1919, the overall manufacturing workforce over tripled its size. And with that 
increased workforce came an increased commitment to labor militancy. 1917 saw a 
strike from the Shipyard Laborer’s Union, who shut down two shipyards for two weeks 
in order to win higher wages. Previously unorganized and unskilled workers also joined 
in the cause, with strikes carried out by railroad laborers, cannery employees, butchers, 
janitors, and telephone operators. The struggles continued to intensify after the war, and 
in October 1919, eleven hundred streetcar and ferry operators struck the Key System for 
ten days. Strikebreakers were called in by the company and in the ensuing violence, 
forty people were seriously injured, seven died in a trolley accident, and forty-eight 
were arrested on strike related offense (p. 48). Despite these efforts, the economic 
recession that followed would largely erase the gains made by the unions, as high 
unemployment gave employers the definite upper hand. Labor would have some 
moments in the following years, but it never would quite regain the same strength.  
During the fallow years of the Depression, it was the federal government, once 
again, that propped up the economy. Large public works contracts were handed out, 
most notably to Henry J. Kaiser. Kaiser had cut his teeth working as part of the “Six 
Companies” who built Hoover Dam. His firm along with another “Six Companies” 
member, Bechtel, was awarded a $3.9 million contract to construct a tunnel that would 
connect new suburbs being built to the east of Oakland (Promes, 2011, p. 61). This 




had long been proposed but it was the infusion of federal cash, a loan of $62 million 
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, that finally made its construction 
possible. The bridge created thousands of jobs and brought in millions of dollars, $4.5 
million of which was given to a Kaiser-Bechtel headed firm to build the substructure of 
the Bay Bridge, and additional sub-contracts awarded to Moore shipyard for a 
commission of caissons needed in the bridge piers. It was a boon to Oakland’s 
economy: in 1935 the port experienced a 62 percent increase in maritime business 
mostly because shipments of materials due for the bridge construction.   
Smaller demographic changes had been occurring during Oakland’s population 
growth of this period, most significantly the growth of a white middle class borne out of 
nativist and economic concerns. The black population also grew during this time, 
doubling from 3,055 in 1910 to 7,503 in 1930: that made them the largest non-white 
population in Oakland (Rhomberg, 2004, 82). Still, they were limited to living mostly in 
West Oakland by discriminatory housing practices that were fundamentally embedded 
in the industry. These racial boundaries were only hardened by the rise of the white 
middle-class. While these conditions might have been bearable for a moment (if grossly 
unjust), they would quickly become untenable with the advent of World War II. 
Oakland’s economy was due for another war boom, but this one would far out-shadow 
the one that occurred during the First World War. California experienced another “Gold 
Rush” as the war effort commenced in earnest to fight the enemy across the Pacific. 
Total federal expenditure for the fiscal year 1930 was less than $3 billion; between 
1940-1946, $360 billion was spent, $35 billion of those federal dollars going to 




by Kaiser’s shipyards: in 1943, Oakland alone built 35.2 percent of the cargo ships 
coming from the West Coast (p. 234). Labor to supply the war machine was in great 
demand: workers were recruited from all walks of life and imported from all across the 
country, but the majority of migrants were Dust Bowlers from the Midwest and black 
people from the South.  
Oakland experienced a massive population increase because of all this in-
migration: from 1940 to 1945 the number of people living in the city grew from 
302,163 to 400,935, or a little over 30 percent. A significant portion of that increase 
occurred in the black population, which more than tripled in size, going from just 3 
percent of the population in 1940 to about 10 percent in 1945 (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 97). 
More than 65 percent of those black migrants came from the South, and they made up 
85 percent of the shipyard’s black workforce (Douzet, 2012, p. 31). These new workers 
were mainly limited to unskilled and low-paid jobs, and many were illiterate and 
destitute (Promes, 2011, p. 64). One commonality these newcomers held, along with 
their reason for coming to Oakland, was a need for somewhere to stay. Unfortunately, 
the city was ill prepared to handle such a sudden growth, especially with most of its 
resources being devoted to the war effort.  
A housing shortage broke out, with many sleeping on the streets, in their cars, or 
with relatives. The situation was not helped by the fact that most of the migrants had 
come with their family, many married or with young children (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 98). 
And nowhere was the shortage more acutely felt than in the black population, forced to 
stay by de-facto segregation in neighborhoods that were already filled to the brim. This 




shelter the newcomers. Any hope for a political solution was dampened by the systemic 
disenfranchisement that had been the rule in Oakland governance for years. 
Post-War Blues 
The end of World War II marked the start of new prosperity in America. 
Prosperity for some, at least. The black community in Oakland saw their problems only 
intensify in the post-war years. Housing was still in short supply and the black 
population was only growing with the return of war veterans and continuing migration 
from the South. Even as the black neighborhoods of West Oakland were being packed, 
there was little relief to be found in the private real estate market, where discrimination 
was rampant. The black population was forced to turn to public housing instead: by the 
war’s end, over half lived in temporary housing built for war workers. If there was any 
solution to be had in the public housing, that was quickly erased by the real estate 
industry, who successfully lobbied for the gutting of the program. After the temporary 
housing was torn down, there would be no new government-built developments to 
replace them. That was the case in the surrounding towns of Oakland, and in 1945 a 
new stream of black migrants came to West Oakland to seek refuge: by 1950, West 
Oakland would be home to 85 percent of the city’s black population (Murch, 2010, p. 
25). The hills, meanwhile, was where developers had been busy with residential 
construction all throughout the 1930s and by the war’s end the area was a sprawling 
suburb ready to house the city’s white, affluent communities. The division between the 
“flatlands” of the inner city and the “hills” of the periphery suburbs would only grow 
more entrenched, especially with veteran’s loans that effectively helped fund this “white 




And although the war brought the Great Depression to an unquestionable close 
for the country, Oakland went through a downturn in its economy as it adjusted to the 
new post-war climate. The war machine began to be disassembled, and that meant 
layoffs for thousands of workers. The first to be cut were the low-skill and low-wage 
jobs that had drawn so many laborers to Oakland in the first place, affecting the black 
and other minority populations especially hard.  Businesses began to leave the East Bay 
for cheaper locales, and the shift of shipping to the interstate highways meant that the 
railroads, which were so crucial to Oakland’s growth, were no longer so vital. 
Technology also played a part in the recession, as automation caused a decrease in 
manufacturing jobs and improvements in agriculture forced rural families to look for 
jobs in the cities (Promes, 2011, p. 67). Inflation was also high after the war, as federal 
decontrols went in place (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 102). All these factors contributed to a 
flagging economy in Oakland, spurring great unrest amongst its workers. That unrest 
culminated in the general strike of 1946 that lasted several weeks. Workers had made 
gains during World War II and were determined not to lose them, like they had after 
World War I. The strike involved 142 unions and an estimated 100,000 workers, across 
race, gender, and a multitude of industries (Douzet, 2012, p. 34). But the unions, 
pressured by the police and city leaders, backed down before achieving any demands. 
This working-class alliance would feature again in a bid to win a majority of the city 
council but would ultimately fail to attain meaningful reforms.  
As the city’s fortunes were continuing to run out, white people were leaving for 
the suburbs in droves. The government was pouring money into these peripheral 




borrowers through Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration 
mortgage underwriting programs. Upwardly mobile whites saw this as their chance to 
leave the poverty-stricken, minority-filled neighborhoods of Oakland proper to greener, 
more ethnically monolithic pastures. The benefits of FHA and VA programs were not 
obtainable by black people. They were effectively barred from getting housing in white 
neighborhoods and the black neighborhoods were redlined through the New Deal era 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, making them exempt from the federally backed 
mortgages. White outmigration and black in-migration would continue, and the overall 
population would drop in Oakland. By 1980, black people would make up a majority of 
the city, 157,484 of Oakland’s residents or 51 percent of the population (Murch, 2010, 
p. 16). 
As the racial makeup of the population changed, so too did the racial makeup of 
the city’s neighborhoods. While most of the black population still lived in West 
Oakland in the 1960s, the black community was starting to expand into other areas in 
North and East Oakland abandoned by affluent whites, driving concerns of racial 
conflict, particularly in the schools. Racial conflict was also pushed by violent policing 
that was rife in black neighborhoods (the “ghettos”), a veritable mode of social control 
by the city. Tensions in the black community were also running high in this era because 
of economic strife. Deindustrialization was dismantling traditional centers of 
employment in Oakland: many were without jobs, and many of those that had one were 
being underpaid (Murch, 2010, p. 38). However, that is not to say all black people were 
impoverished during this period of Oakland history. Places like Seventh Street, which 




exemplify a thriving black entrepreneurship even in an adverse environment (Murch, 
2010, pp. 26-30). Indeed, the black middle class would be instrumental in leading the 
charge for black political mobilization.  
Still, although some were well-off, the overall economic situation was grim in 
Oakland. In 1964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson declared a War on Poverty, the 
city was one of a few to be designated a depressed area by the federal Area 
Redevelopment Act. The unemployment rate of the city was double the national rate at 
8 percent, and it was even worse in certain flatland neighborhoods, standing as high as 
14 percent (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 137). The new program targeted these areas (North 
Oakland, West Oakland, Fruitvale, East Oakland) that were majority poor, and also 
mostly home to black and brown families. The anti-poverty program, funded through 
the federal Economic Opportunity Act, was designed for job training and technical 
education. Though the program was for poor minorities, they had very little say in its 
design. Instead, the program was largely shaped by those from the professional class, 
including those of the black professional class. The results from the anti-poverty 
program were ultimately marginal at best: bureaucratic gestures did little to alleviate the 
vast systemic shackles placed on minorities and the poor. It was this stagnancy that was 
the catalyst for black radicalism, a tradition carried by the Black Panther Party.  
The Black Panthers, unlike some previous black activist movements, were not 
concerned with concessions and compromise with the white ruling class. Instead, they 
espoused black power and community self-determination. Their founders, Huey 
Newton and Bobby Seale, were participants of Merritt College’s Black Studies 




for Self Defense in 1966. The Black Panther Party agenda focused on providing basic 
needs to the community through the community and arming themselves for protection 
against the state. It was the latter point that most defined them in the popular 
imagination: young black men (and women) dressed in black leather and holding rifles. 
But it was the former that perhaps would be their most meaningful impact, grassroots 
programs like free breakfasts for schoolchildren, sickle cell anemia testing and grocery 
giveaways (Promes, 2011, p. 70). What the Black Panthers represented, black 
radicalism born of the campus combined with wide mobilization of the economically 
marginalized, frightened those in power. The FBI’s director, J. Edgar Hoover led an 
aggressive campaign against the Black Panthers in order to destroy them. He would 
succeed, to an extent: the Party would fall apart in the end, fighting over its direction 
within its ranks and contesting with outside pressures from the state. But their legacy 
would live on, the words of its members inspiring new generations of activists to take 
up their anticolonial and community-based struggle.  
Urban Renewal 
 Across America, cities were all suffering from a similar blight in a post-war era. 
Federal policy had led to a white exodus from the urban core to the suburban periphery. 
Those left living there were mostly the poor and minorities, and the housing stock was, 
on the whole, inadequate both in terms of units available and quality of construction. 
Jobs were also hard to come by, as industries followed their ideal workforce out of the 
city. Infrastructure was aged and crumbling, and the available funds to deal with these 
problems was diminished because of the shrinking tax base.  In attempt to deal with 




renewal” with the passage of the Federal Housing Act of 1968 and the Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) Act of 1968. The leaders and business elite of Oakland, 
wanting to bring lost economic glory and the middle class back to the city, formulated 
an ambitious plan to transform Oakland’s urban landscape.  
This strategy to gut and redevelop the city started early, in 1949. The city 
council designated West Oakland as blighted, marking large swaths of land for 
demolition. The intention behind the proposal was for public housing to be built in this 
area to replace the torn-down buildings (although residents believed some housing 
could instead be rehabilitated), but this Progressive-minded goal never came into 
fruition (Douzet, 2012, p. 33). Indeed, this designation became justification for a more 
conservative-bent urban renewal, one that would place commercial interests over the 
ones of residents.  
The leaders of Oakland turned their focus on transportation, which was one of 
Oakland’s strengths in the era of trains and ferries but had become less of an advantage 
with the advent of the automobile and long-haul trucking. The highway had replaced the 
rails and business elites were keen to lay out the miles of asphalt that would put 
Oakland in a better condition to grow. By the late 1950s, the Oakland City Council had 
approved for at least three interstate freeways through West Oakland, the historic 
transportation center. Then in 1956, legislation was passed to establish the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit District, which encompassed Alameda, Contra Costa and San Francisco 
counties (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 125). The BART system would replace the old Key 
system, linking Oakland with the rest of the Bay metropolitan area in the late 1970s. 




transportation system did not bring traffic and capital into Oakland. Instead, money 
flowed out, to the neighboring San Francisco. And West Oakland, already cut through 
with highways, was once again ran through with BART elevated tracks. The port 
facilities were also upgraded to keep up with the new focus on international commerce, 
but its profits would go towards maintenance and improvements within the port, with 
none contributing to the city’s general fund (Promes, 2011, p. 73).  
West Oakland was decimated by the process of building up this transportation 
network: Seventh Street, the once bustling business hub and entertainment zone of the 
area was destroyed by the BART construction. Freeways effectively cordoned the 
neighborhood on its north and east edge, and even split it, as was the case of the Grove 
Shafter. Not only did destruction come from the placing of new routes, significant parts 
of the historically black neighborhood were flattened for new housing, new housing that 
would fail to replace the units lost. Between 6,600 and 9,700 housing units were lost 
between 1960 and 1966, displacing over 10,000 people: a one-fifth net loss of the 
housing supply in the end (Douzet, 2012, p. 41; Promes, 2011, p. 73). Ventures like the 
Acorn Project and the Oak Center, implemented by the General Neighborhood Renewal 
Plan of 1959, made clear that urban renewal was not for the residents of these areas. A 
fifty-block area was entirely demolished for the Acorn Project, and middle-income 
housing built in its place, in hopes that those who moved in could revitalize the 
struggling downtown (Hayes, 1971, p. 108). Public housing or low-income housing was 
not profitable and thus it was not built, pricing the previous residents out. Money was 
instead spent building projects that had clear economic benefits, such as the Warrior’s 




renewal plans, as in other cities across America during this period: commercial interests 
consistently put at the forefront, and the poor and minority residents ignored.  
Oakland, Today 
In the end these ambitious proposals did little to help Oakland. As the economy 
continued to transition from manufacturing-based to service-based, workers who had 
traditionally benefitted from well-paying jobs found themselves forced into low-paying, 
insecure jobs or simply unemployed. Moreover, the good-paying service jobs that were 
created tended to go to the affluent and more educated workers who lived in the hills or 
in the suburbs outside of Oakland, and not the residents of the flatlands (Douzet, 2012, 
p. 67). Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s Oakland continued to decline, private 
capital unwilling to invest in an area deemed decaying despite millions spent by the city 
in order to please business interests. These impoverished conditions proved ripe for the 
epidemic of drugs and crime, which hit the flatland neighborhoods particularly hard 
(Promes, 2011, p. 76). Fortunes for the city took a turn with the election of Mayor Jerry 
Brown in 1998, who promised the construction of 10,000 new housing units. But like 
his predecessors, Brown was concerned with courting commercial players and bringing 
capital to Oakland: these units were to attract the young and well-to-do back to the inner 
city (Douzet, 2012, p. 75). The Bay Area’s Dot-Com boom made Oakland attractive to 
developers, particularly as the cities surrounding it were already overbuilt. Brown’s 
efforts made a difference: the 2000 census saw an increase in the city’s white 
population, the first since 1950 (Rhomberg, 2004, p. 190). Today, Oakland no longer is 
a majority black city, but split evenly between white, black, Asian and Latino 




Gentrification as a Framework 
   With that history in mind, we can better understand gentrification’s look in 
Oakland. In particular, we might pay special attention to the racial connotations of it, as 
the city that had failed to house its poor and minorities, particularly those from the black 
community, jumped to provide housing for the white and affluent. Discriminatory real 
estate practices and racist federal lending programs prevented black people from 
moving into better homes in the hills, making them homogenous enclaves for whites 
and the flatlands a homogenous enclave for black people. Then, as federal policy 
insured mortgages, real estate saw an opportunity to buy low-income housing for cheap 
and then sell them to buyers that had been traditionally excluded from homeownership 
(Taylor, 2018). Subprime loans were targeted towards these buyers, meaning black and 
Latino residents. Thus, the foreclosures of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis 
disproportionately affected homes in West and East Oakland, neighborhoods that had 
been previously redlined (McElroy and Werth, 2019, p. 885). These foreclosures have 
played a significant role in the gentrification of Oakland, along with unlawful detainer 
evictions (stemming from a breach of lease). As McElroy and Werth (2019) argue, we 
cannot just transpose the San Francisco “Tech Boom 2.0” model of gentrification, we 
have to pay attention to the real, racialized history that underlies dispossession and 
displacement in Oakland.  
But we would be remiss to limit our conception of gentrification to built 
environment and geography alone. Indeed, Werth and Marienthal (2016) provide a 
framework on how gentrification can be used as a broader term to capture feelings of 
“belonging and disbelonging” (p. 720). Like the example of font choice from earlier, the 




authors take note of how “talk of gentrification is ubiquitous” in areas not limited to the 
traditional definitions of urban studies. Rather than further refine and restrict the 
concept, Werth and Marienthal (2016) state: 
 In our perspective, then, the ubiquitous and unruly use of the term is 
neither a conceptual problem nor a political failure. Instead, it is in itself 
a rich and meaningful subject of research on urban life. The irrepressible 
talk of gentrification points to the multiplicity of sites in which 
consequential formations of belonging and disbelonging are forged in 
practice. (p.720) 
The authors introduce the idea of gentrification as a “grid of meaning”: it structures the 
struggles of a diverse set of actors over who belongs, what they call the “deserving 
public”. The deserving public is the legitimate political community who shape and 
organize the relations of rights and responsibilities of different actors and agencies, a 
community that is constantly being negotiated. Gentrification is not just a 
transformation of spaces by political and economic forces, but rather a way in which 
people experience and preform their relational identity and claims. It becomes clear 
how we might then apply the idea to sports fandom, which also finds itself concerned 
with questions over identity and belonging. It makes utter sense why the irrepressible 
talk of gentrification might also bleed into talk of fandom, which is a significant arena 
for individuals to perform and project their identity. So, while fandom may not be 
gentrified in the traditional sense of the word, it can certainly feel like it. The Warriors 
make a particularly rich case study, as their rise coincided with intensifying processes of 








The Rise and Fall of the Golden State Warriors 
The Makings of a Dynasty 
Winning an NBA championship is hard. A team must first win enough games to 
qualify for the post-season playoffs. Depending on the year (and the team), this first 
step might feel like a formality or an impossibility, although statistically a team should 
make the playoffs around half the time. Let us say your team does make the playoffs 
and even gets a good seeding position. In the NBA, this means being one of the top four 
teams in your conference (East or West), as the top eight teams make up the playoff 
field. Then, they must win four 7-game series against the best of the best. The format 
almost eliminates the randomness that inevitably factors into who wins, leaving only 
cold, hard meritocracy. Truly, only the best of the best can win an NBA championship. 
In the past twenty years, just nine different teams have won one. Four of those 
championships were won by teams led by LeBron James. The sad reality is that the vast 
majority of fans may never see their team hoist the Larry O’Brian trophy in their 
lifetime3. Winning several, in consecutive years? Well, you might get lucky.  
The Warriors got lucky. Unlike so many other teams, they found the right 
players, at the right price, at the right time. Perhaps the most important element to the 
Warriors’ success was finding talent where it was not always apparent. They managed 
to draft probably the best shooter in the history of basketball, a shooter who, while not 
the best in history, is one of the best in his generation and one of the smartest defensive 
                                                      
3 As an avid fan of the long-suffering Portland Trail Blazers, this is unfortunately probably true. 
However, as any REAL fan knows, one must never resign yourself to that kind of pessimism. In the 





minds in the game today. For those who are not aware, this is extremely difficult to do. 
The NBA Draft, where teams get to choose from a bevy of skilled 20-somethings for 
their roster, is fittingly referred to as a lottery. No matter how advanced the analytics of 
a data-cruncher or keen the eyes of a scout, it is always a gamble to take a chance on 
unproven talent. The Warriors might have taken an even bigger gamble than usual by 
selecting players who were not highly lauded coming out of college. However, college 
play is not always an accurate prediction of NBA play. Plenty of teams have taken a 
player high in the draft because he destroyed the competition in the NCAA, only for 
him to be out of the league in a couple seasons. Injuries, attitude issues, just not being 
good enough: there is an unmeasurable number of variables that factor in to whether or 
not a player “makes it” in the NBA.  For the Warriors to take those chances and be 
rewarded that handsomely is rare indeed. 
The winning roster they assembled was also done on the cheap, thanks mostly to 
Curry’s lingering ankle injuries4. In sports, there are very few things fans can come to a 
consensus on. Injuries being awful is one of them. It never feels good to watch a player 
go down, face twisted in pain and clutching at a limb. But in the Warrior’s case, injuries 
are what allowed them to sign Curry to a much smaller contract than a player of his 
caliber would normally command. After an ankle surgery, Curry ended up agreeing to a 
four-year, $44 million extension in the 2012 offseason. To put that contract in 
perspective, All-Star point guard Damian Lillard signed a five-year, $140 million 
maximum extension with Portland as his initial rookie contract was set to expire. Of 
                                                      
4 Curry first sprained his ankle in the preseason of 2010-2011, and would deal with more injuries to it, 




course, the circumstances were a bit different. Lillard was the 2012 Rookie of the Year 
and understood to be the future face of the Blazers, while Curry had been playing 
second option to Monta Ellis. Regardless, the contract was a bargain for Curry, who 
would transform into a once-in-a-generation type player. The money they saved with 
that deal was then used to secure savvy veterans and shore up deficiencies on the roster, 
all while staying under the salary cap. Lacob is not nearly as stingy as some owners in 
the NBA, but he and his partners do not have the billions to throw around like a Steve 
Ballmer, the ex-CEO of Microsoft who owns the Los Angeles Clippers. The NBA is an 
arms race, and the Warriors got a nuclear warhead at the price of an RPG. 
While the rise of the Warriors was not necessarily pre-destined or obvious in the 
moment, it was timely. The league was in-between dynasties when they won their first 
championship in 2015: the San Antonio Spurs were aging out of relevancy, the Lakers 
seemed worse with every missed midrange jumper, the Heat no longer had the 
triumvirate of Lebron James, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh. It was a whole new world 
in the NBA, and the Warriors were the team best positioned to take advantage of the 
fact. That is hindsight speaking, of course. Vegas had the Cleveland Cavaliers as the 
favorites to win it all, while the Warriors sat seven spots back. Maybe the Cavs would 
have won it all, had their star players Kevin Love and Kyrie Irving not gone down 
because of injury. But it is pointless to argue over hypotheticals. The reality is the 
Warrior’s style of play, one that valued a free-flowing, three-point heavy offense and 
position-less, switching defense would be the one to change the way the game is played. 
Before, teams relied on big, hulking centers to protect the basket. Now, every team is 




the Warriors were the perfect representation of how basketball has evolved away from 
lumbering post play, to fast-paced jump shooting. Where once the most valuable player 
award was dominated by towering, physically imposing forwards and centers, could 
now be rewarded to a slight, baby-faced point guard standing a mere 6’2”.  
Joseph Lacob acquired the team in 2010, in what could only be considered a 
coup. Chris Cohan was looking to sell the team, after many disappointing seasons under 
his tenure, and most assumed the Warriors would be bought up by Oracle founder Larry 
Ellison. Despite the fact he was the highest bidder, the team was instead acquired by 
Lacob and his partner Peter Guber. Finance-wise, Lacob and Guber were at a clear 
disadvantage to Ellison. One was a multibillionaire, to the tune of $28 billion, while the 
other two were a Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers partner and a Hollywood executive. 
Rich, yes, but not wealthy enough to compete on capital alone. Instead, Lacob and 
Guber had to cut a deal outside the standard auction, promising Cohan $450 million for 
the team with a guaranteed $20 million up front. It was a record-breaking amount of 
money for an NBA team, but an investment that would pay in dividends. To onlookers 
it seemed ridiculous to pay $450 million for an irrelevant basketball team that hadn’t 
won anything meaningful in the past 50 years. Of course, that once irrelevant team 
would go on to win three championships in the next six years. Today, the Warriors 
franchise worth is estimated around $2 billion (Strauss, 2020, pp. 9-23).  
In an April 2016 New York Times Magazine profile, Lacob would make the 
statement that would go on to define the tenor of that Warriors team: “The Warriors 
were light-years ahead of probably every team in structure, in planning, in how we’re 




typical technobabble of a Silicon Valley venture capitalist. To Warriors fans, it was an 
affirmation of the philosophy that created one of the best teams the NBA has ever seen. 
What makes for “light-years ahead” moves? For Lacob that meant bringing in 
newcomers to key roles: Bob Myers to be GM, a former agent who had never held the 
position before, Mark Jackson to be head coach, a T.V. commentator, and who was 
soon replaced by Steve Kerr, who had been the GM for the Phoenix Suns but never a 
coach. It meant tapping Jerry West, NBA logo and legendary executive, to serve as a 
consulting board member. It meant, in short, to treat the Warriors like any other 
company Lacob invested in. Instead of running the Warriors in a top-down, dogmatic 
fashion, Lacob preferred to sit back and let the best minds do the work. Decisions were 
made by coming to a common consensus, rather than given by one, final voice. 
That does not mean the brains of the Warriors always made the best decisions. 
For one, they tried to trade Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson for nine-time All-NBA 
point guard Chris Paul. The deal made sense at the time. In 2011 there was no way of 
knowing how good Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson were going to be. Curry had 
spent much of his time in the NBA sharing the ball with Monta Ellis or sidelined with 
ankle injuries, and Thompson was a rookie who had been convicted for possession of 
marijuana. Chris Paul, on the other hand, was a known commodity. One of the best 
playmakers in the league, Paul was averaging almost 20 points and 10 assists for the 
New Orleans Hornets. The deal was close to going through, but Paul refused to commit 
to the Warriors beyond the end of his current contract. And why would he? The 
Warriors were one of the worst teams in the league and he wanted to win a 




ring he hoped for), but that was only one of many aborted deals involving Curry and 
Thompson. The Warriors, mostly due to luck, avoided giving away their two best 
players: hardly a demonstration of the “light-years” prescience the franchise projected. 
Even their head coaching hire of Kerr happened by chance: The Warriors front office 
first tried to get former Orlando Magic coach Stan Van Gundy. He ended up signing 
with the Detroit Pistons, leaving them with no choice but to turn to their second option, 
Steve Kerr. Even the smartest guys in the room came very close to ruining what would 
be the best team in basketball. Sometimes fate looks more like luck in the light. 
2015, or the Beginning  
The first fated, or lucky, championship came in 2015, the first year with head 
coach Steve Kerr, who replaced Mark Jackson. The firing of Jackson came as a 
surprise: under his guidance, the Warriors went from a 23-win, bottom-of-the-barrel 
team to a legitimate playoff contender. If success in the NBA is measured by wins, then 
Jackson was a successful coach and successful coaches are not usually sacked. But 
underneath his accomplishments was a coach not quite good enough to get his team to a 
championship. Jackson’s responsibilities were split, as he continued work as a Los 
Angeles-area pastor even while coaching in Oakland. He refused to hire the best 
available assistant coaches, preferring instead men who would not question his 
authority. Jackson was not maximizing the talent given. A first round playoff exit after a 
7-game series against the Los Angeles Clippers sealed his dismissal.  
Enter Steve Kerr. A member of the legendary Jordan-led, Phil Jackson-coached 
Bulls team, Kerr had gone on to be a successful basketball commentator for TNT and a 




up with vision and support from his knowledgeable coaching staff. If Jackson helped 
the Warriors become good, Kerr made them great. The Warriors went from being just 
another playoff team jockeying for position into legitimate frontrunners. They won 67 
games that year, 16 more than the previous year, and did so in a dominant fashion, 
beating teams by an average of ten points. That continued into the post-season, where 
they easily swept the New Orleans Pelicans, dispatched the Memphis Grizzlies in six, 
dropped only one game to the Houston Rockets and finally finished off a depleted, 
Lebron-led Cavaliers team. That championship was the first after 39 years of mostly 
irrelevancy and mediocracy and perhaps the last that would be fully appreciated by any 
non-Warriors NBA fan. For while the Warriors could enjoy the status of fresh-faced 
newcomers in 2015, they and their fans would quickly wear on the nerves of the rest of 
the league in the years to come.  
2016, the Year of the Comeback 
2016 was a historic year, as much as any year can be arbitrarily labeled 
“historic.” Americans watched mostly in horror at the collapse of one projected winner 
and mostly in unabashed glee at the collapse of another. Of course, any parallels 
between Hillary Clinton’s presidential run and the Golden State Warriors’ 
championship run are tenuous at best. But it is true that much like Hillary was expected 
to easily win over her far inferior competition in Donald Trump, the Warriors were 
almost certain to steamroll the rest of the NBA in their quest for their second-straight 
championship ring. Where they were great in 2015, they were disgustingly so in 2016: 
out of 82 games, they lost only 9. The average winning margin in those 73 games: 10.7 




the league. Pundits and regular Joes argued over if they were the greatest team the NBA 
has ever seen, debates which raged from radio waves to Twitter threads. The Warriors 
were certainly the winningest team the NBA has ever seen, at least in the regular 
season. But as they would be reminded again and again, the win-loss record is only 





Figure 3. Chicago Bulls forward Scottie Pippen wearing a tank top with the phrase “72-
10…Don’t mean a thing without the ring”. He and the 1995-1996 Bulls team set the 
previous regular season win-loss record when they went 72-10 and would go on to win 
the championship that year.  
One could dismiss this argument as pure bitterness from Warriors haters who 
were tired of watching their team lose again and again to the team from the Bay. Yet for 
a certain subset of basketball fans, winning a championship is the only measure of 




got to hoist the Larry O’Brian again. As it turns out, the winningest team in NBA 
history would also be one to lose in the most spectacular and historic fashion. 
The Warriors faced their first real test in the playoffs and summarily aced it in 
the first two rounds. They only dropped one game in each of their series against the 
Houston Rockets and the Portland Trail Blazers. The wins were not quite as dominant 
as their regular season ones and the Warriors had to work to come back from behind in 
several. Worst of all, Curry missed several games with injury. Still, it was never a 
question whether they would move on to the Western Conference Finals. It was there, in 
that contest against the Oklahoma City Thunder, a team that was practically 
unstoppable seemed to return to the mortal plane. After four games, the Thunder were 
up 3-1 in the series behind the excellent play of Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook 
and it appeared that the Warriors had finally met their match. It was there, on the brink 
of defeat, that the Warriors regained their invincibility. They won Game 5 120-111 
without too much drama, belied by the cheers of Oakland faithful. The next win was at 
the Thunder’s home arena in Oklahoma City, and suddenly it was a tie series at 3-3. 
Only nine teams had ever come back from a 3-1 playoff deficit, and never in the 
Western Conference Finals. History was not on the Warriors’ side, and indeed, they 
found themselves trailing for much of Game 7. Then, in the 3rd quarter, Curry did what 
he does best: hit a three, this one to tie the game at 54-54. The Warriors, inevitable, 
would win and move on to a much-anticipated championship rematch against the 
Cleveland Cavaliers.  
The matchup felt different the second time around. For one, the Cavs weren’t 




acrobatic guard Kyrie Irving both able to play this time. Despite that, and the fact 
Lebron was formidable as ever, they still found themselves playing the role of 
underdog. And this Warriors team was a history-making favorite, having only lost 15 
games total coming into the championship. After four games, the Warriors were ahead 
of the Cavs 3-1 in the series, a position reverse of where they were in the previous 
round. They blew out the Cavs in the first two games, lost in a one-sided 90-120 affair, 
and then pulled away in the second half to win Game 4. The Warriors were headed back 
to Oakland, where there was no doubt in anyone’s minds that they would win their 
second-straight chip in front of their adoring home crowd to cap off an almost perfect 
year of basketball. After all, no one had ever blown a 3-1 lead in the championship 
finals.  
If there was any doubt about the Warriors coming into Game 5, it was because 
Draymond Green, the team’s defensive anchor and lynchpin, had gotten himself 
suspended. Green can best be described as a troublemaker, one who could not help but 
talk trash to referees, coaches, opposing players, fans on the sideline and whoever else 
might bother listening. This habit often got him into foul trouble, though not as much as 
one might expect. Green also had developed a habit of hitting opponents in the groin: 
thus, the one-game suspension. The Warriors lost Game 5 in a close contest, and then 
were thoroughly embarrassed from the start of Game 6, in which the Cavs outscored 
them by 20 in the first quarter alone. Curry was even ejected from the game. The 
Warriors had one last chance at home to win and prove their 73-9 season did indeed 
“mean a thing.” The competition was tight for most of Game 7, neither team able to pull 




Cavs. Several minutes of tense back-and-forth action later, it was tied 89-89 at the 4:39 
mark and it would stay tied for another three agonizing minutes. It was anyone’s ball 
game, until it wasn’t.  
First was the Block. With just 1:50 left in regulation, Andre Iguodala grabs a 
rebound off a missed jumper and quickly runs it up the court. The Cavs are slow to get 
back, and the Warriors outnumber the Cavs 2-1 on the break. One pass later and 
Iguodala goes up for the layup. But as the ball leaves his hands, LeBron seems to fly in 
from out of the frame, pinning Iguodala’s attempt to the backboard. Where it seemed 
like the Warriors were sure to take the lead, a split second later and the game remained 
tied. Next was the Shot. The Cavs got the switch they wanted, with Curry, the worst 
defender on court for the Warriors, guarding Kyrie Irving on the perimeter. Kyrie 
dances, dribbling the ball patiently into a step-back 3-pointer. Curry contests it, but his 
resistance is futile. The shot drops and the Cavs lead, 92-89, 53 seconds left to play. 
Time is running out for the Warriors. Their almost effortless ability to score seen over 
the course of the season has seemed to dry up in the final stretches of the game. Curry 
misses another three-pointer and, to make matters worse, Green fouls LeBron on a dunk 
attempt. Two free-throws later, and the Cavs lead by four points with only 11 seconds 
on the clock. The Warriors, barring a miracle, are going to lose. Still, the Warriors fans 
packing Oracle refuse to let their hope die. After all, was this season, the historic 73-9 
finish, not a miracle in itself? They had suffered through years of irrelevancy and 
mediocracy to end up at this moment. They had already accomplished a miracle 
comeback against the Thunder, so what could be a more perfect conclusion than 




The last possession after the timeout is a mess from the start. Green gets the ball 
in to Thompson, who ends up trapped on the sideline. In the flurry, the Cavs commit a 
foul, and the Warriors must inbound again. But at last, Curry ends up with the ball, 5 
seconds left to play. If anyone can force this game to overtime, it would be him. No one 
in the history of the NBA has been a more accurate, more prolific, three-point shooter. 
A perfect season is on the line. Legends will be made in this moment. Curry goes into 
his signature side-step three, a shot that hangs for what seems like an eternity. It clanks 
off the rim unceremoniously. Iguodala rebounds it and puts up one last shot, but the 
game is over. The Cleveland Cavaliers have won the 2016 NBA Championships, after 
being down 1-3 in the series, and have done it on the Warriors’ home court. The record-
setting 73-9 season is quickly overshadowed by the Warriors inability to win a single 
game in the last three that they played. The dynasty must wait.  
2017, the Dynasty’s Peak 
Although they lost in the Finals, there is no denying that the 2015-2016 Warriors 
were one of the best teams ever seen in NBA history. That great team managed to get 
arguably better after the off-season, because they landed another MVP-winning, 
multiple-All-Star-and-All-NBA having, Olympic-gold-medal-owning type player. The 
Warriors signed free agent Kevin Durant. The dynasty was delayed but for a summer. 
The league and its fans were sent into an uproar. How was it fair for a stacked team to 
get even more stacked? Stars joining other stars to form “super teams” was not new, but 
what was new was the outright reek of opportunism that the move gave off. Especially 
since Durant had a huge opportunity to beat the Warriors in the Western Conference 
Finals but had choked away a 3-1 lead. He was painted a coward, and the Warriors the 




super team to end all super teams. The 2016-2017 season that followed felt like it had a 
forgone conclusion. The Warriors strolled through their games in the regular season, 
and then the post-season, winning the Championships over the Cavs, 4-1. The next year 
was much of the same, not trying very hard and still winning games during the regular 
season and routing their competition in the playoffs. The only real threat happened in 
the Western Conference Finals. The 1-seeded Houston Rockets had a 3-2 edge over the 
Warriors, and Iguodala—who was a sizeable part of the team’s success—had gotten 
injured. But Houston, who had built their success on three-point shooting, went 
historically cold, missing 27 attempts in a row during the last game. The Warriors 
survived and went on to sweep the inferior Cavaliers in a series that was never really 
close. In just four years, the Warriors had won three rings.  
2018, the Closing Act 
But the cracks were starting to show. Perhaps it was unsustainable to win so 
much in so little time. Maybe it was because no team could balance the egos of multiple 
NBA stars for more than a couple years. Or was it the impending free agency of Kevin 
Durant that cast too big of a shadow over the season? Whatever it was, the 2018-2019 
Warriors were not nearly as great as the team that, just a couple years ago, went 73-9. 
They still got the one seed in the West, but the effort was lackluster throughout the 
season. The flowing, pass-heavy offense that had defined the look of the Warriors in the 
Kerr-era was more sluggish, the ball tending to stick because of the isolation-heavy sets 
they ran for Durant. For the first time since 2014, it felt like the Warriors were a team 
ultimately destined to lose. They struggled against the lesser talents of the Los Angeles 




won in six games, but not in a way that felt convincing. The series against Houston was 
another slog: after four games the series was tied 2-2. It was a series that had potential 
to stretch out into the full seven games, especially with Durant leaving late into Game 5 
with a calf strain and sitting out the next one. Instead they closed out the second round 
in straight wins, moving on to the WCF and sweeping the undermanned Blazers. 
Despite all the doubts swirling around the team, the Warriors were back into the Finals 
for the fifth year in a row, where they would face the Toronto Raptors. 
  It was here where luck finally ran out for the team from the Bay. Or rather, the 
bad luck came in droves. Durant missed the first four games dealing with his calf strain 
and Thompson was out for Game 4 because of a hamstring strain. The Raptors were 
able to take advantage of the Warriors depleted core, snatching a 3-1 lead over the 
defending champions. The Warriors needed to win Game 5 or else the series was over. 
And win they would, though it would come at a terrible cost. Early in the second 
quarter, with the Warriors up 39-35, Kevin Durant attempted to blow by Serge Ibaka: 
something gave, forcing Durant to hobble off the court and into the locker room. He 
tore his right Achilles, an injury that would effectively end his time as a Warrior. The 
next game would produce a tragedy of equal, if not greater, magnitude. Klay Thompson 
would tear his ACL in the third quarter on a dunk attempt. He stayed on court to hit the 
resulting free throws, but that was the last nail in the Warriors’ coffin. The Raptors dealt 
with what remained of their opponent, and the Warriors and their fans, yet again, 
watched the visitors celebrate a championship win on the hardwood of Oracle Arena. It 
was the last Warriors game to be played in the Oakland institution, the last Warriors 




In the summer that followed, Durant would sign with the Brooklyn Nets. Klay 
Thompson would sign a new contract with the Warriors and undergo surgery on his 
ACL, set for rehab with no timetable for his return. The front office would trade away 
former Finals MVP Iguodala and lose a good portion of the previous roster. The new 
look Warriors were younger but clearly not the title-contending favorites NBA fans had 
come to expect over the years. Indeed, the inaugural 2019-2020 season played at the 
glimmering new Chase Center resembled something much closer to those woeful years 
before the Warriors became the face of the NBA. For the first time in seven years, the 
Warriors failed to qualify for the playoffs. In fact, they were one of the worst teams in 
the NBA, managing to only win 15 games by the end of the season. For all Lacob’s talk 
of the Warriors system being “light years” ahead, they were right back where they 
started: at the bottom. As of now, it is hard to say when the Warriors might be 
legitimate title contenders again. Certainly, it will be near impossible to achieve the 
same heights they reached during that five-year span, from 2014-2019. But perhaps that 
matters less than the real, undeniable legacy and influence those Warriors teams had. 
From style of play, to use of analytics, to front office management, they left their mark 
on how the NBA is run today.  
Legacy alone might not sustain the hearts of fans, especially ones that are used 
to winning. In a way, this fallow period for the Warriors is a test of faith, one that will 
separate the true believers with those who only wanted to bask in reflected glory. Much 
sports fandom scholarship has focused on the effects of a winning record on fan 
behavior: understandably, the correlation between the two is positive. Winning 
increases the attendance at games and the number of fans that follow a team. If we are 




to follow that logic then, losing should cause the opposite. Really, the Warriors’ terrible 
2019-2020 season could have not come at a worst time if the goal was to fill seats at an 
expensive new stadium. Lacob, even with his “light-years” ahead thinking, could have 
never predicted this outcome back in 2012 when the plan to move to S.F. was 
announced. For the longtime Oakland fans this was perhaps the only true outcome that 
could come of moving the Warriors across the Bay. Poetic justice for the team to have a 
losing record right as they left Oakland, the city where they made their dynasty. The 
Warriors, unlike many other sports teams, ostensibly represent a region in name rather 
than a city. They play for “Golden State” rather than “Oakland” or “San Francisco.” But 
as I have touched on before, it would be a mistake to take that to mean those two cities 
or the Bay can be thought of as a monolith. The history of the two cities has created a 
tension between the two, one that would play out in the realm of sports and fandom as 
we will see next.  
Commented [LJ11]: this will be touched on in the 
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Textual Analysis of Media 
We begin our look at the changing meaning of the Warriors and the identity of 
its fandom in 2012, when the move to San Francisco was first announced. This was the 
second year under Lacob, and the team was still struggling. We can get a sense of the 
look of the Warriors fandom and its relationship with the team’s management at this 
time in an episode that occurred March 20, 2012. As a SFGate article titled “Honor for 
Mullin turns ugly with boos for Lacob” explains, the Warriors home crowd turned ugly 
when owner Joseph Lacob took the mic to speak at former Hall-of-Fame Warrior Chris 
Mullin’s number retirement. As Simmons (2012) details, fans had been giving cheers 
and standing ovations for everyone else associated with the Warriors prior to Lacob. 
The chants of “Monta” during the booing made it clear the Warriors fans in attendance 
were expressing an anger held by the fandom at large over the deal that sent the guard 
to Milwaukee for Andrew Bogut. Adding to frustrations was the promise of playoff 
berth, which did not happen that season. As Strauss (2012) explains about the episode, 
“people are passionate in Oakland, and it's going to be visceral and unadulterated or it's 
not going to be” (para. 10). An article for SBNation fan site Golden State of Mind 
reiterates the sentiment, commenting “I think Warriors fans are great (I count myself 
among them obviously). We are loyal. We are passionate” (Zamir, 2012, para. 3). These 
two statements are telling of the Warriors fandom identity in 2012. To be a Warriors fan 
means you are passionate, to the point of booing the owner during a jersey retirement, 
and loyal, to the point where losing an above-average, undersized point guard upsets 
you enough to boo the owner. Really, one would have to be both in order to remain a 




Beyond just basketball, the image of Warriors fans booing the owner also has a 
strong class connotation. The vast majority of fans at the game were working class, 
whereas Lacob is a millionaire venture capitalist. And in 2012 neither venture 
capitalists nor millionaires were particularly popular in America. After all, the woes of 
the Great Recession that many were still recovering from were caused, for the most 
part, by the investing activity of that corporate class. Frustrated with the actors and the 
system that had led to the recession in 2008, the Occupy Wall Street movement was 
born: one of its strongest and most outspoken chapters happened to be in Oakland. So 
yes, fans were booing Lacob because he traded away a favorite player and the team was 
bad, but a different read on the situation might be that this was frustration over yet 
another bourgeoise capitalist ruining something for the proletariat.  
Another reading of this incident is that Lacob represents Silicon Valley, and 
more broadly, San Francisco. That is, after all, where he made his millions in the first 
place with an investment in a biotech company. In contrast to its neighbor across the 
bay, Oakland was never a huge hub for tech and certainly was not a city known for the 
demographic that the industry attracted. That was starting to change with gentrification: 
as Mahler (2012) noted about Oakland in the New York Times Magazine, “the tent poles 
of the new American city have already arrived — the urban bike shops, the restaurants 
with locally sourced fare, the cafes with fair-trade coffee, a Whole Foods.” These 
yuppie intrusions perhaps felt even more offensive as many Oaklanders prided 
themselves on being the antithesis of San Francisco, a city that was consistently 
overvalued by “the media, tourists and capital” (McElroy and Werth, 2019). The 




in Oakland for 47 years. Perhaps we might see, then, the booing of Lacob as a rejection 
of San Francisco and its Silicon Valley ethos by long-time Oakland residents.  
We move then to May 22, 2012. The Warriors held a press conference where 
they announced that they were planning to move to a new stadium in San Francisco by 
the 2017 season. A photo gallery on the Warriors NBA.com website shows the Warriors 
front office and owner with Mayor Ed Lee sitting on a stage set on the bare concrete 
where the new stadium and entertainment center will lie, the Bay Bridge right in the 
background. Emphasis is put on the quality of these new facilities and its location close 
to many different transit options. Benefits of the move are mostly spoken about as 
benefits to the Bay Area as a region, as opposed to San Francisco as a city, besides the 
San Francisco Travel Association President and CEO who specifically talks about the 
arena as “something San Francisco needs” (NBA.com, 2012, slide 18). Hines (2012) 
points out that moving will increase the team’s marketability, although the Warriors 
have always been able to sell seats (ranked 10th in attendance for the 2011-2012 season 
despite one of the worse records). The economics of the move are clear: The Warriors 
current arena is old, the surrounding area “uninteresting.” The new location has more 
nightlife and is closer to a downtown location, which means more money. But more 
money for whom? The Warriors, certainly (although they had to finance the project 
privately and would have no help from the city). San Francisco, too, benefits from the 
tax revenue and increased tourism. What the leaders orchestrating the move are clearly 
avoiding in their speeches is the impact it will have on Oakland and the East Bay fans. 




regional identity could overcome the disparate histories of individual communities. And 
they overestimate, perhaps, the unifying ability of sports.   
While those accounts focused mainly on the positives of the move to San 
Francisco, others dealt with possible downsides. For instance, how might this affect the 
look of the Warriors fandom? That is the question that concerns Carillo (2012), and he 
gives several warnings: that the diehard Warrior fans might be priced out of the new 
arena, that the new SF fans are less likely to stick around for a losing team, that the SF 
fans are less interested in basketball, and that SF fans are “softer”. Here, we see a clear 
difference presented in the identity of Oakland or East Bay fans, and the fans from San 
Francisco. Once again, the Oakland fans are characterized as loyal and passionate. SF 
fans, in contrast, are front-runners who only care about the social aspects of going to a 
basketball game. Carillo also gets to another aspect of Warriors fan identity that was 
hinted at briefly before: their toughness. He sees the Oakland Warriors fans as being 
“ruthless,” “vicious,” and having an “edge.” Interestingly, Carillo characterizes San 
Francisco as a city (not just the fans) as being “soft.” We can infer, then, that more than 
just speaking to the character of fans, Carillo is really thinking about the larger 
identities of Oakland and San Francisco.  
 Who belongs in the Warriors fandom between the two? For the author, the ones 
who truly belong, who truly are Warriors fans, are the fans from the East Bay. Unlike 
the Warriors press release about the move, Carillo implies that the Warriors represent 
Oakland, not the Bay Area as a whole. San Francisco may as well be a city in a whole 
other state from the way its fans are presented in the article. Carillo’s conception of the 




Francisco is seen as a wealthy, professional class city. Oakland is seen as more 
working-class, a city that has known struggles. We can see from these accounts of the 
move that the construction of the Warriors as the Bay Area’s team is tenuous. Far from 
being a “common and simplified” symbol of the Bay like the team positions itself and 
how the Steelers were for Western Pennsylvania in Kraszeweski (2008),  it seems 
evident in Carillo’s (2012) perspective that the Warriors are instead Oakland’s team and 
that the identity of its fandom is built around the city. Sports media, in this account, did 
not produce a flattened and clear place-image of a region but rather reproduced the 
conflicts within it.   
The connection between Oakland and the Warriors also forms the basis of 
Thompson II (2015), in his article about the Warriors parade to celebrate their first 
championship of the dynasty. He makes the claim that the identity of the Warriors is 
tied intimately to Oakland. As Thompson (2015) states: 
These Warriors are flashy and stylish in presentation, the way they play 
on the court. Yet at their core, why they’re successful, is because of their 
willingness to grind. Just like Oakland. 
These Warriors are underappreciated on a national scale, where mostly 
perception replaces reality. But by those who are around them, who’ve 
experienced them, they are unapologetically adored, flaws and all. Just 
like Oakland. (paras. 11-12) 
The narrative and identity of team and city are intertwined here. The aspects of Oakland 
that are important to its identity (grind, underappreciated nationally, not seen for what it 
truly is) are projected onto the team. But this is more than just projection by a fan, for 
the team itself embraced The Town mentality explicitly, as statements made by players 
during the ceremony made clear. Sports teams are polysemic and symbols of multiple 




showed, it is possible for a team’s identity to be bound so tightly to an external group 
identity that it becomes indistinguishable. The Warriors, in this case, are made 
synonymous with Oakland itself. Thompson II is careful to acknowledge that the team 
represents the Bay Area and that its fans are from more than Oakland alone. But those 
areas play are secondary to “Oakland, its culture and passion and role in the Warriors 
becoming champions” (Thompson II, 2015).  The Warriors, made symbol of Oakland, 
are seen as a vehicle to shift perceptions of Oakland nationally. As the AP (2015) 
bluntly put it “Oakland — a city that usually makes news for crime, corruption, protests 
and violence— shined in the national spotlight” (para 1). Oakland has constantly been 
cast in a negative light by the national media and has lived in San Francisco’s shadow 
since its founding. For that reason, the Warriors championship win had a special 
significance for the long-time Oakland fans and why it was so important to emphasize 
The Town in the team’s identity and its fandom’s identity, especially for Thompson II 
who was writing for a local newspaper and audience.    
But as he mentioned, the Warriors wins mattered for more than just Oakland, 
and increasingly so thanks to the bandwagon effect. When a team starts winning, they 
become more popular and gain more fans: across sports, this is the ironclad rule. The 
Warriors were no exception and many of the fans it picked up seemed to be from the 
“Silicon Valley techie crowd” as one article put it (Kim 2016). But that was no 
coincidence. For that demographic, the Warriors in particular held a special meaning. 
The owners of the Warriors, many coming from those same Silicon Valley crowds, 
were taking credit for the team’s success and pinning it on the lessons they learned from 




who profiled Lacob and other prominent figures in the Warriors front office for New 
York Times Magazine. More than basketball, the piece reads like a business report. The 
players and the game of basketball fade into the background as management style, 
analytics and planning take prominence. The place-image shown through sports media 
here had less in common with Oakland and more with Silicon Valley. Perhaps there was 
no better illustration of this shift in Warriors identity and fandom than the signs that 
were made for the 2016 Championship Finals.  
 
Figure 4. Sign made by a Warriors fan. (Skeets, 2016) 
This sign, and others in a similar vein, were immediately mocked all over social 
media, the criticism particularly vicious in the writings of the ever-notorious NBA 




go to get the sign printed and laminated professionally. The choice of font (a sans-serif), 
too, speaks to a certain boring corporate sleekness associated with Silicon Valley. Then 
there is what is actually written. It is silted and awkward, with random phrases put in 
all-caps for emphasis. It is overwhelmingly dorky as well: there is no way to take 
“LOSER CRY BABY JAMES” as a serious insult. This single bad fan sign seemed to 
speak to the corniness of the white, Silicon Valley techie fans as a whole. As one 
Twitter user put it, “Bro this is literally the effects of gentrification. Dubs fans were like 
Raiders fans before. The crowd looking like Utah” (@Localsixsurfer 2016). In this 
Tweet, we can see what Werth and Marienthal (2016) meant by “the irrepressible talk” 
of gentrification.  Not only is it a concept to discuss urban spaces, it is a way for 
individuals, such as @Localsixsurfer, to understand what is happening in social spaces 
as abstracted as sports fandom. The meaning of “Dubs fans were like Raider fans 
before” is that Warriors fans were perceived in the past as reflecting the historic 
residents of Oakland: more black and Latino, more working class, more tough. Now, 
the crowd looks “like Utah,” meaning white dorks of a more affluent crowd. 
Gentrification is not just something that happens to neighborhoods here; rather it speaks 
to broader feelings of who belongs and who doesn’t.   
The characteristics of San Francisco fans given by Carillo (2012) seemed to only 
coalesce more in the team’s identity with the addition of Kevin Durant. The team was 
no longer content to “grind” as Thompson II (2015) put it and they certainly were not 
underappreciated by those outside of Oakland anymore. Grit, too, was nowhere to be 
found in how they recruited Durant: a begging text sent right after a championship loss. 




regular season, they felt the need to add another world-class player to the roster. As 
Rosenburg (2016) put it, this was a “competitive cop-out”. The Warriors could win a 
title without Durant (as they did before) and Durant could win one on a different team. 
The fact that they decided to join forces speaks to a kind of pragmatism, or maybe 
cynicism, that winning is all that matters. The Warriors became the ideal team for the 
San Francisco fans outlined by Carillo (2012), i.e. the Silicon Valley types, and moved 
farther from the image of the underdog team from Oakland that we saw presented by 
other previous media accounts.  
Not only did the team appear to abandon the Oakland ideals that made it into a 
winner, it physically abandoned the city when it finally moved, in 2019, to the new 
arena planned seven years before. Rhoden (2019) documented the reactions from 
Oakland residents when the Warriors left. Many pointed to the cultural differences 
between the Town and the City. Mayor Libby Schaaf said: 
San Francisco has always been sparkly and fancy, much wealthier, and 
Oakland has always had grit and grind and celebrates its diversity, 
authenticity and working-class culture…We all felt the Warriors 
embrace that. This idea that teams abandoned the communities that have 
linked their identity with the team for economic reasons always feels 
hurtful. (paras. 16-17) 
The Warriors were the Bay Area’s team in name, but the Bay Area is a region too 
diverse in identity to be united by a single team. The team’s identity was connected 
most strongly to Oakland, especially for the long-time fans of the region, and we can 
see that from earlier place-images in the media analyzed. So, when they left it felt like a 
betrayal for those fans. Instead of remaining loyal to the black and brown, working-
class city of Oakland, the Warriors moved for the whiter, more affluent city of San 




And just as Oakland lost the Warriors to San Francisco and Silicon Valley, its 
residents were losing their homes to the same group (Allen-Price, 2017). Driven by the 
foreclosures of the recession and influx of tech money, gentrification was ravaging 
Oakland’s neighborhoods: at a pace, in fact, that is the highest in the Bay Area (Maclay, 
2017). A 2016 survey conducted by Coliseum College Prep, a public secondary school 
in East Oakland with help from the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project makes it abundantly 
evident that the residents of Oakland have felt this change first hand: out of 723 
respondents, 60 percent saw a racial shift, 50 percent saw a loss of long-term residents, 
and 76 percent saw higher housing prices (AMEP, 2016).  At the same time as this 
intensifying gentrification, long-time Oakland residents saw their hometown team, the 
Warriors, turn from underdogs into frontrunners and the fans packing the lower bowl of 
Oracle look more and more like the newcomers driving their rents up. The Warriors 





If a fandom can be gentrified, the case of the Golden State Warriors is the 
closest that comes to reproducing the same feelings of “belonging and disbelonging” 
that Werth and Marienthal (2016) saw, the same political, economic and social patterns 
we expect to see on city streets. All of this is rooted in Oakland’s unique situation and 
history: an industrial city, one born of rails and ships, that grew at an enormous rate 
because of war. A city abandoned by the industries it once led, a city left to rot in the 
shadow of the glittering towers of San Francisco. A city that was and is a hotbed for 
black, brown and Asian activism, the birthplace of the Black Panthers. The Town and 
its residents were familiar with struggle and they saw that reflected in the Warriors. 
There was a sense of belonging to the team and its fandom, a sense that they belonged 
to Oakland.   
As we saw, that sense of belonging was complicated by the team’s move to the 
West Bay. But even before the new arena was completed and the move made official, 
the identity of the Warriors and its fandom was moving more towards San Francisco 
and Silicon Valley. The Warriors during this period did not act as a stable and 
uncontested representation of the Bay Area. Instead, it was a medium where the 
competing community claims of the region played out, most notably the rivalry between 
San Francisco and Oakland. The Warriors team and fandom identity reflected the 
conflicts of the region caused by gentrification. And this instability can be seen through 
the media accounts of the Warriors: in sports media, the place-image of the Bay Area 




A team can feel like home, but what is home when the neighbors, businesses, 
buildings, streets all change? Perhaps the Warriors fandom was a way for the new 
transplants who came because of tech money to feel comfortable in their new place of 
residence, like how Baker’s (2018) New Zealand fans found home through football 
fandom. But for the long-time fans, these newcomers might have seemed too similar to 
the people rendering their neighborhoods unrecognizable. Much focus is on the material 
ramifications of gentrification: we might look instead to how the consequences of 
gentrification spill into other dimensions of life.    
 
Figure 5. Stephen Curry posing in the “Oakland Forever” City Edition jerseys. The 
design borrows element from the “We Believe” era Warriors (2006-2007). (Chazaro, 
2021).  
Perhaps if the Warriors management had understood clearly how gentrification 




release of a new jersey. In 2020, the Warriors debuted “Oakland Forever” City Edition 
jerseys as a nod to the city that they left. Rather than mend the relationship between 
them and Oakland fans, the new jerseys instead provoked ire. A visual gimmick could 
not bridge the feelings of disbelonging that had been forged in the move to San 
Francisco. The longtime Oakland fans saw the jerseys not as a tribute, but as a reminder 
of all they and the region’s communities have been dispossessed of: first home, then 
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